This paper analyses the relationship between equality of opportunities and characteristics of the educational systems, jointly considering country-and school-level features. Because the peer group composition represents a fundamental channel in shaping educational opportunities, we consider all policies, surveyed in the PISA 2006 dataset, that affect the sorting of students to schools. Our empirical analysis shows that the inclusion of sorting policies enhances the capacity of explaining the determinants of the socio-economic gradient with respect to previous studies including only countrylevel features. In particular, it casts doubts on the prominent role attributed to school tracking. However sorting policies do not fully account for the influence of school composition on the socioeconomic gradient; the direct inclusion of peer variables allows to highlight the equalizing impact of mixing students from different backgrounds. Among the other policies, also pre-school enrolment, public expenditure in education and ability tracking display a significant equalizing effect.
Introduction
Inequality in students' performances still remains a persistent feature of modern societies in spite of the generalized expansion in educational attainments. Beyond differences in attained degrees, a large part of inequality pertains qualitative differences among attended schools and are related to the increased diversification of the educational offer (e.g. private vs.
public, vocational vs. academic-oriented). From a normative standpoint, the fraction of educational inequality related to circumstances out of the individual responsibility, i.e. the family background 1 , appears unacceptable. Factors affecting the peer group composition and the learning environment at school include tracking, both between-schools (i.e. the choice between vocational or general programmes) and within-school (i.e. grouping students by ability in all or in some subjects), urban segregation, school admission policies, parents' and students' preferences, etc. All 1 . Family background could influence offspring performances directly, affecting their values and preferences, and indirectly, affecting the student's sorting in the different types of schools.
these factors concur in sorting students to schools of different quality; however, the impact of each policy is often difficult to disentangle in a casual way by empirical analysis because either policies and/or initial student's abilities are not observed (Nechyba 2006) . Even if oneto-one causal effects linking each educational policy to inequality through the peer group composition are difficult to disentangle, it is still possible to estimate an "ex-post" association between school composition variables and educational inequality.
These insights are incorporated in our empirical strategy, which consists in comparing the estimates derived from two main econometric specifications. In the first, we attempt to decompose the level of the FBE using a set of "exogenous" country-and school-level policies that are known to have a direct impact on students' sorting, namely tracking and school admission procedures. In the second, we directly estimate the relationship between peer level variables and the socio-economic gradient, also controlling for country-level features as in the first specification. The comparison of these two models allows to evaluate if sorting policies are sufficient for explaining the link between equality of opportunities and peer effects. More in general, the inclusion of peer variables substantially enhances the understanding of the determinants of the socio-economic gradient. Although the PISA dataset does not offer reliable identification strategy for the peer effects 2 , we believe that including these variables consents to assess the interesting correlation between a "broad contextual effect" and the socio-economic gradient and, further, adds explanatory power to our regressions. Having in mind this caveat, we keep talking of "peer effects" rather than of "contextual effects" in order to simplify the exposition. This paper departs from comparable studies such as works of Schuetz et el. (2008) and Brunello and Checchi (2007) , in two respects. First, these studies focus only on the effect of country-level characteristics and policies on the socio-economic gradient, whereas we attempt to explain the FBE also considering policies and features affecting students sorting at the school level. Second, among these sorting policies we do not include only tracking among 2. In particular, it does not offer an identification strategy that consents to copy with the well-known endogeneity of the peer effects. The only possibility in the PISA dataset is to claim that this endogeneity problem can be substantially mitigated by adding variables related to the sorting of students to schools, such as school-level effects and admission policies at the school level. This claim has been used by Rangvid-Schindler (2007) and Schneeweiss and Winter-Ebmer (2007). different school programs (i.e. general vs. vocational), but we consider a broader set of channels affecting the peer group composition (e.g. the school admission procedures and how students are tracked by ability inside the school).
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the theoretical link between policies affecting peer group composition and educational inequality.
Section 3 presents the dataset and introduces the main variables of interest. Section 4 offers a preliminary analysis of the relationship between sorting policies and peer variables. Section 5 describes the econometric strategy, whereas section 6 shows the results and section 7 concludes.
Policies affecting the peer group composition
In both theoretical and empirical literature on peer effects, the impact of peer composition has been mainly analyzed in relation to the issue of maximizing the stock of human capital.
The key finding of this literature is that alternative ways of sorting heterogeneous students affect the aggregate level of human capital only if peer effects enter non-linearly in the schooling production function (Benabou 1996 , Hoxby 2000 . With respect to inequality, theoretical predictions are more straightforward since the equalizing effect of more heterogeneous classes does not hinge upon the shape of the educational production function (e.g. de Bartolome 1990 , Durlauf 1994 , Benabou 1996 , Fernandez and Rogerson 1996 3 . On one hand, if the transfer of knowledge depends upon personal interactions, a low ability student benefits from the interaction with a high ability student, which in turn would have been better off by interacting with peers at its level. On the other hand, teachers should adapt to a more heterogeneous class setting higher (resp. lower) targets than the ones prevailing in a class with only low (resp. high) ability students.
Since peer group composition is largely endogenous, the existing empirical literature has mainly analyzed the indirect impact of policies affecting it. Among these policies, vast empirical evidence shows that postponing the choice of school offering different programmes reduces the effect of parental background on students' choices and attainments (see Meghir Ability tracking represents another important policy affecting the peer group composition.
The impact of this policy on the socio-economic gradient is however less clear even when abilities are partially correlated with family background. In principle, more homogenous classes reinforce students' differences through peer effects and therefore increase the dispersion of students' achievements. On the other hand, ability tracking might favour the homogenization of programs and teaching styles, hence increasing the outcomes of both lowand high-ability students with no clear consequences on educational inequality. In addition, the interaction of students which are too heterogeneous might favour the emergence of It is worth noticing that tracking does not exhaust the set of policy features influencing students' sorting and the dispersion of students' achievements (Nechyba 2006 , Waldinger 2006 ). The sorting process is in fact constrained by other structural factors shaping individual choices. Admission procedures at the school level and residential segregation (strongly related to income through housing prices) could constrain students choices and make them more 4 . However, educational systems with an early tracking age often puts vocational and specific training at the centre of their development strategy (Hall and Soskice 2001) , hence vocational schools might attract also students with background above the average 5. In particular: i) complementarity among similar ability types or equivalently convexity of the peer effects (Benabou 1996) ; ii) positive learning externalities brought about by a more homogeneous class; for instance because greater homogeneity eases teaching (Lazear 2001 ). 6. On this point, the interesting paper of Checchi and Flabbi (2005) compares the criteria of admission to the academic track (preparatory to university education) in Italy and Germany. They found that in Germany the main criterion is ability, whereas in Italy unrestricted tracking renders parental background more important. 7. The number of slots in academic schools also matters Checchi 2007, Brunello et al. 2007) . Consistently with the model of Betts (1998) , they show that a smaller number of slots in academic schools, equivalent to a higher standard for entering these schools, might decrease inequality as some high ability students end up in vocational schools.
dependent on parental background (Durlauf 1994, Fernandez and Rogerson 1996) . For instance, costs of mobility or limited number of slots in schools located in rich-neighbourhood could restrain the choice set of more motivated students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
Finally, parental and students' idiosyncratic preferences are likely to generate a large amount of variability in the analysis of the determinants of peer group composition.
In light of these considerations, tracking policies alone are likely to be an imperfect predictor of school peers composition, i.e. they could not be considered the main policies influencing the dispersion in students achievements. This motivates our claim of considering the joint impact of a broader set of educational policies affecting the peer group composition.
Dataset and main variables
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between peer group composition and the socioeconomic gradient using the 2006 release of the PISA survey, carried out by the OECD. This survey interviews 15 year-old students, using schools as principal sample units from which students are sampled at a second stage. Differently from other dataset such as TIMMS, the PISA survey focuses on cognitive problem solving skills and real world applications rather than on strictly curricular competences. PISA 2006 provides standardized scores on students' capacities in three broad domains: math, science and reading.
In this study, we focus on test scores in math for sake of comparability with the more closely related work (Schuetz et al. 2008 , which, using TIMMS, analyze performances in math). For the same reason, we use the variable "number of books at home" as the proxy of the family background. Preliminary analyses available upon request show that, consistently with other studies using different datasets (Wößmann 2003 (Wößmann , 2004 , books outperform other possible family background variables, such as parental occupation or education, in explaining students' achievements. In the PISA dataset, books at home are recorded through six categories, not directly providing a synthetic index. However, Schuetz et al (2008) show that this multinomial variable can be linearized without losing the explanatory power of the regression, so we follow them in doing this linearization.
As measures of peer level variables at school-level 8 , we use the average number of "books at home" among schoolmates, net of the individual one, and the standard deviation of the number of books at home among schoolmates, to capture possible non-linearities and the role 8 . Pisa does not provide information about students at the class-level; hence peer composition can be inferred at the school-level.
of peer heterogeneity (Rangvid 2007, Raitano and Vona 2011). In order to partially account for cross-country differences in students' sorting, peer heterogeneity is measured as the ratio between the standard deviation at the school level and the one computed at the country level.
This normalization is required since peer heterogeneity at the school level could be inflated by higher background dispersion at the country level.
Finally, the PISA dataset records several exogenous students' characteristics -i.e. age, grade, gender, first-or second-generation immigrant -, whose averages at the school level (net of the individual one) represent other peer group composition variables potentially affecting students' outcomes. In particular, the shares of first-and second-generation immigrants in the school encompass interesting characteristics of the school and the contextual environment, being probably higher in ghettoes or in less rich neighbourhoods.
Concerning policies affecting the peer group composition, the literature has emphasized the importance of national policies setting the age of the first tracking among schools offering different curricula, i.e. academic vs. vocational, and the number of tracks available. However, there is no widespread agreement in the literature on the best way of measuring tracking policies 9 . Here, we use two alternative measures: 1. the age of first tracking; 2. a dummy capturing the comprehensiveness of the educational systems, which is equal to one if the system tracks students before they are aged 13 and 0 otherwise (i.e. in more comprehensive systems) 10 .
Moreover, additional information on school-level policies potentially related to the peer group composition are available in the PISA dataset. Specifically, admission procedures (i.e.
if the area of residence and the previous student record is a priority for being admitted in the school) and ability tracking inside the school (available in the three modalities: none, in some subjects or in all subjects) determine the extent to which students with similar ability and background tend to be sorted in the same learning environment. Therefore, we build a set of what we call "sorting policies" potentially affecting peer level characteristics using dummies capturing partial and full ability tracking, admission through residence, admission through student record and, at the national level, school tracking policies.
Finally, the socio-economic gradient could depend on several country-level educational of the pre-primary school and the enrolment share in it, the share of public expenditures in education, the enrolment rate in private schools, the per capita GDP and the per-capita spending in education. Table 1 provides further details on the variables used in this paper.
Descriptive and preliminary analysis
Equality of educational opportunities widely differs across countries and this fact represents the main motivation of our study. Differences are evident by carrying on bycountry OLS regressions of the math scores on "books at home" controlling for basic individual characteristics (grade, gender, age, first-and second-generation immigrants and considering interactions between the immigrant status and the background variable). This preliminary analysis seems to partially justify the approach followed by previous studies, which gave a prominent importance to tracking policies. However, looking at other sorting policies potentially affecting the peer group composition, namely proxies of ability tracking and of admission procedures followed by schools, it has to be noticed that their diffusion is far from being uniform across countries (table 2) . Ability tracking is confirmed to be widely diffused in Anglo-Saxon countries (Epple et al. 2002, Betts and Shkolnik 2000a) .
In turn, the share of students admitted by residential location is generally higher in comprehensive systems, with distinct exceptions of Germany, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Italy, Korea and Japan. Admission criteria based on student records are fairly prevalent in the early-tracking system and in Korea and Japan.
Next step is to show that sorting policies affect the peer group composition along both the unobservable ability and the family background dimensions. Concerning the first -absent information on individual ability before school enrolment -, we proxy heterogeneity in ability within the school as the ratio between the standard deviation in test scores within the school and the standard deviation in test scores at the national level. From the theoretical insights 11 . This discrepancy could be due to the larger number of countries included in their dataset. discussed in previous sections, the ability dispersion within the same school should be: 1)
higher in the comprehensive system, as between schools selection is absent; 2) lower if students are selected according to previous marks, as students turn out being more homogeneous; 3) higher in presence of ability tracking within the school, as it leads to polarization in attainments among classes; 4) ambiguous with respect to residential admission 12 . Table 3 (column 2) shows regressions of our measure of ability heterogeneity on sorting policies, including country fixed effects. In spite of this limited number of controls, the explanatory power of the regression is above 40%. All sorting policies have the expected sign and are statistically significant. Interestingly, admission by residential location leads to a greater heterogeneity, probably because urban segregation is not particularly strong in the majority of countries considered.
A second check consists in analyzing how observable peer composition, based on family background of schoolmates, is affected by sorting policies. In table 3, column 3 and 4 show results obtained using the same specification as in column 2 considering, respectively, the school-level average and the normalized standard deviation of the book at home variable as dependent variables. The average peer level is significantly higher in comprehensive systems and lower when any other sorting policy is implemented, apart from the case of students chosen according to their previous records. Peer heterogeneity is significantly higher the later school tracking is and when admission depends on residence. Conversely, ability tracking seems to increase the heterogeneity in backgrounds when it regards some subjects. In general, sorting policies explain a decent fraction of the between school differences in peer group composition. However, especially for peer heterogeneity, still a large fraction is left unexplained including only these policies. The inadequacy of available sorting policies to deal with the issue of peer group endogeneity will be addressed in the next section.
Empirical strategy
Testing the effects of policies, both at the school-and country-level, on equality of opportunities can be carried out in two ways. A first possibility is to estimate the socioeconomic gradient by country and, in a second step, regresses it on national-wide educational 
where u isc is an independent error term and m isc is a dummy equal 1 for imputed values of the books at home variable, built following the standard procedure as in Fuchs and Woessman (2007) . Among student characteristics, family background B isc is then affected by school-and country-level policies through their respective interaction terms. Furthermore, we interact the FBE with first-and second-generation immigrant status I isc in order to capture the possibility that the FBE varies between natives and immigrants. The inclusion of country-level policies P c is required to disentangle their impacts on equity from the one on efficiency. For the same reason, we add broad school fixed effects (F sc ), built as the deciles of the average background level of the students in school s of country c. These school-level effects roughly capture the quality of the school-specific learning environment.
In estimating equation (1) and all following specifications presented in this paper, individual observations are weighted for their sample probability. Besides, the hierarchical structure of the data is considered taking countries as the primary sampling units and applying cluster-robust linear regressions, which impose independence of observations across sample units but any structure of the errors' variance-covariance matrix for observations belonging to each unit 13 .
An important remark is in order here. Schuetz et al. (2008) excluded school-level characteristics from the empirical specification since, focusing only on cross-country comparison, they wanted to depurate the FBE from school-level features affecting the sorting of students to schools of different quality. Our empirical strategy is complementary to theirs as we attempt to quantify the importance of cross-country differences in school-level policies that are known to affect student sorting and the distribution of educational opportunities.
However, as pointed out by Schuetz et al. (2008), results obtained estimating equation (1) could be driven by unobservable country-level characteristics affecting students' sorting.
Hence, following their suggestions, we run a second specification where country fixed effects F c and their interactions with basic student characteristics X isc are added. More precisely, we estimate: of country-level policies and features P c , but it consents to assess how these policies affect the FBE under the assumption that unobservable cross-country heterogeneity is unrelated to the size of the FBE. This identification requirement appears more likely to be satisfied with our approach where, explicitly, within-country heterogeneity in school policies affecting sorting is controlled for. In a nutshell, since sorting policies are relevant determinants of FBE through peer group composition and substantially differ across countries (see table 2), there is still a fraction of unobservable cross-country heterogeneity that is not accounted for by policies and systemic features considered at the country-level. Therefore, adjusting for these school-level features reduces the bias associated to unobservable country features.
However, the sorting policies are only an imperfect predictor of peer group composition, which is recognized to be the key factor shaping the distribution of educational opportunities.
A more direct way to assess the impact of the peer variables on the socio-economic gradient 13 . In fact, in the PISA dataset, the primary sample units are schools. Since we use both school-and countrylevel variables, the choice of the hierarchical structure is less clear. However, results available upon request show that nothing changes by taking schools as basic sample units in the cluster-robust regression.
consists in interacting peer variables with the FBE. In this case, the econometric specifications of eq. 1 and 2 become respectively: where the mean, net of the individual one, and the standard deviation of the number of books in the school are included. The difference in the explanatory power and in the results of these two (direct and indirect) estimation approaches captures the extent to which observable selection polices fully account for peer level variables. It is, however, worth to remark that peer effects are not precisely identified by our econometric strategy, so they are basically not distinguishable from broader contextual effects.
However, insofar as sorting policies and broad school fixed effects are correlated with peer effects, an extended empirical specification including both sorting policies and peer variables would consent to mitigate the endogeneity of peer effects, hence reaching a more accurate identification. This extended specification is also useful to investigate if sorting policies capture other mechanisms affecting the FBE. For instance, after controlling for family background, ability tracking might reduce inequality as it allows high-ability students from worse family background to interact more closely with high-ability well-off peers.
Results

Basic Specification
In table 4 Table 4 reports results of the model with school selection policies and school fixed effects. A later track still reduces the FBE, but the effect is only weakly significant.
Concerning school-level policies, ability tracking significantly reduces the FBE after controlling for family background, whereas admission policies based on students' abilities increases it and residential location does not encompass any particular effect. Finally, a large 27% increase in the explanatory power of the regressions occurs when moving from model 1 to model 2 15 .
Another 8% improvement in the 16 . In spite of the strong correlation between our two ways of measuring school tracking, the early-tracking variable appears to capture additional features of the educational system positively correlated with the FBE.
significant with a 1% increase in pre-school enrolment leading to a 1.1 reduction in the FBE (see the third last row in table 4).
Results of fully-fledged models, when we enrich the model 4 with either school tracking or the full set of sorting policies, are shown in table 4, models 5-6, respectively. In both models 5 and 6, our main variables of interest remain of similar sizes and at same significance levels, with the exception of the admittance by residence that now exerts a significant impact on inequality of opportunity. Our results are also robust to the inclusion of other attributes of the peer group composition, such as the share of females and the ones of first and secondgeneration immigrants, which are not statistically significant (model 6).
Country Fixed Effect Specification
A tougher test of our results consists in replacing the linear country-level policies with a full set of country and country per student fixed effects and in re-estimating models 1-6 (table 5, models 7-12). This specification is our favourite one as it encompasses several unobservable features of the education system that might render indistinguishable the effect of targeted policies on equity and efficiency. As would be expected, the R 2 of country fixed effect models is substantially higher than the one of basic models (compare table 4 and table   5 ). Looking across table 5, the size of the autonomous FBE appears much smaller than in the basic models of table 4.
Concerning our main variables of interest, school tracking stops having any significant impact on the FBE already in the benchmark model 7 and independently on the way used to measure it. School sorting policies exert the same kind of impact shown in table 4 -apart from the admittance by residence which is not significant also when peer composition variables are added -whereas country-level policies are never significant. Even if slightly smaller with respect to the basic specification, a one-percent increase in pre-school enrolment brings about a decline in the FBE which ranges between 0.67 and 0.96. Another interesting result emerges looking at the model with peer variables, i.e. model 9. In the country fixed effect specification, peer heterogeneity increases its effect on students' scores: an increase in one standard deviation of peer heterogeneity leads to a larger 8.4% decrease in the average FBE.
In turn, linear peer remains significant, but almost halves in size.
Concluding remarks
This paper extends previous analyses on the relationship between students' equality of opportunities and characteristics of the educational system, jointly considering country-and school-level features. With respect to previous studies, tracking policies appear much less important up to become statistically insignificant when either other sorting policies at the school level or peer variables are included in the analysis.
However, policies affecting students' sorting do not fully account for the peer group composition. This explains why the influence of peer group composition on the FBE, also if not perfectly identified, remains largely significant in spite of the inclusion of a full set of sorting policies and increases the explanatory power of the model. Consistent with the theoretical literature, peer heterogeneity reduces the FBE, especially in our favourite country fixed-effect specification. With regards to school sorting policies, ability tracking appears to reduce the FBE across different empirical specifications.
These results enable us to drawn two main insights for future works. First, the effect of school tracking is mainly captured by its indirect effect on the peer group composition. But the opposite is not true as determinants of the peer group composition and especially of its relationship with the FBE remains largely unexplained. Unfortunately, identifying the impact of each sorting policy on the FBE via the peer group composition cannot be carried out in absence of a comprehensive set of sorting policies, both at the national and at the neighbourhood-school-level. These considerations bring us directly to the second practical insight derived from our analysis. We claim that, being absent detailed information on policies affecting student sorting, an ex-post direct specification of the relationship between the socio-economic gradient and the peer variables is a useful policy instrument. Rather than general conclusions on how each policy affects educational opportunities, our analysis could be useful to policy-makers for setting a target level of peer variables and then searching locally the best solution to reach it. 
